High Household Debt Could Temper the Strength of the Economic Rebound

With the U.S. economy showing increasing signs of stabilizing and the rate of its contraction slowing markedly in the Second Quarter, the question arises as to how vigorous the rebound will be once it gets underway. A look at the 10 earlier post-World War II recessions offers a measure of insight.



In those earlier recessions, the mean change in real personal consumption expenditures and real GDP for the four quarters following the bottoming of real GDP came to 4.4% and 4.9% respectively. The median figures for real GDP were 4.6% and 5.4% respectively. During the last three recessions, both real personal consumption expenditures and real GDP rebounded notably more slowly.

One popular argument that is often heard is that, in general, the sharper the contraction, the stronger the recovery. A regression analysis of the previous post-World War II recessions suggests a very weak relationship. The coefficient of determination for such an outcome is just 0.180. The mean error using the extent of contraction as the independent variable came to 1.5 percentage points with respect to the actual growth of real GDP in the four quarters following the trough.

A broader set of data that used household debt as a percentage of nominal GDP at the beginning of the recession and growth in real personal consumption expenditures during the four quarters following the trough in real GDP as independent variables fared better. The coefficient of determination came to 0.671. In addition, the mean error was 0.9 percentage points.

Although the data set is small, what the data suggests offers some insight into looking ahead to the robustness of the economic recovery following the bottoming of the economy. In particular, the statistical analysis reveals:

• Higher household debt (as a share of nominal GDP) provides a headwind that impedes the vigor of the first four quarters of an economic recovery.

• The magnitude of the increase in real personal consumption expenditures is positively correlated with the magnitude of increase in real GDP.

In fact, on closer inspection, the data suggest that the magnitude of household debt is a potentially important determinant in how strongly real personal consumption expenditures recover. The coefficient of determination between household debt as a percentage of nominal GDP at the start of the recession and rate at which real personal consumption expenditures rise following the bottoming of the economy is 0.423. In other words, the rate at which real personal consumption expenditures increase following the trough of a recession is, in part, a function of household debt.

At the start of the current recession, household debt stood at a staggering 97.9% of GDP. 76.3% of that debt was tied up in mortgages. In contrast, during the 2001 recession, household debt came to 74.7% of GDP and 65.2% of that debt was comprised by mortgages. During the 2001 recession, home prices continued to rise. During the current recession, which was sparked by the collapse of a massive housing bubble, U.S. home prices have fallen 32.0%, as measured by the seasonally-adjusted Case-Shiller Index.

In the wake of the collapsed housing bubble, the household sector has been experiencing deleveraging. Household debt has fallen $158.8 billion. In addition, saving as a percentage of disposable income has risen sharply from a quarterly average of 1.5% of disposable income at the beginning of the recession to 5.2% of disposable income in the Second Quarter.

In sum, the household debt burden is another indication that the upcoming economic recovery will likely be shallower than has been the norm during the post-World War II experience. Given the magnitude of household debt, economic growth in the real GDP of 1.5% to 2.5% over the four quarters following the bottom of the recession is probably more likely than the post-World War II median figure of 5.4%.

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A Tale of Three Recessions

Last Friday, the Bureau of Economic Analysis released the 2009 Second Quarter GDP data. The latest information showed that the economy contracted by a 1.0% annualized rate and real personal consumption expenditures fell by an annualized 1.2%. To date, the current recession has seen peak-to-trough GDP decline by 3.9%. That is the largest decline of the post-World War II era.

The three biggest recessions during the post-World War II era are the 1973-75, 1981-82, and 2007-present recessions.



In the current recession, real personal consumption expenditures have fallen almost as much as they fell during the 1973-75 recession. With ongoing deleveraging and a rising unemployment rate, an additional decline is possible in the Third Quarter. In addition, real gross private domestic investment has plunged by 32.1% from its previous peak. That is the largest decline during the post-World War II period.



As noted earlier, household deleveraging is likely to place a lid on potential growth in personal consumption. The current recession differs markedly from the two earlier recessions cited above in that household and nonfinancial corporate leverage was substantially greater than it was during the 1973-75 and 1981-82 recessions.



The notably greater nonfinancial corporate debt could dampen a recovery in gross private domestic investment at a time when personal consumption is likely to play a smaller role in the upcoming recovery than in the recent past. In the 1973-75 and 1981-82 recessions, real personal consumption expenditures returned to their pre-recession peak two quarters after bottoming out.



This time around, a less robust recovery in real personal consumption expenditures is likely, even as real personal consumption expenditures accounted for a much larger share of real GDP than during the 1973-75 and 1981-82 recessions. It is plausible that it could take 3 or even 4 quarters from the bottom for real personal consumption expenditures to return to their earlier peak.

That means that gross private domestic investment, a reduction in the nation’s trade deficit, and increased government spending will need to lead the way to a sustainable economic recovery. However, the higher level of corporate indebtedness suggests that the recovery in gross private domestic investment will likely be a gradual one. Furthermore, given the high level of mortgage debt, the residential construction component of real gross private domestic investment, which has fallen 56.9% from its peak, is also likely to be slow. As a result of those two factors, the 1973-75 experience in which it took 8 quarters from its trough for real gross private domestic investment to return to its earlier peak is probably more likely than the 1981-82 experience in which it took just 4 quarters. An even lengthier recovery period is plausible.

A continued unwinding of the U.S. trade deficit should help strengthen the recovery, once it gets underway. However, the overall impact of this unwinding will likely be modest, if a global recovery pushes up the price of crude oil over the next 12-24 months.

Given the federal government’s unprecedented budget deficits, the recent massive expansion in federal spending is not likely to be sustained. Maintaining the aggressive fiscal posture could undermine investor confidence in the U.S. government, driving down the foreign exchange rate of the U.S. dollar, and generating a rise in long-term interest rates that could impede economic activity. In addition, with the IMF recently highlighting the medium-term fiscal challenges facing the U.S., namely the need to establish a credible fiscal consolidation strategy, efforts to curb the growth of federal expenditures could get underway in a year or two.

In sum, restrained growth in personal consumption, a slow recovery in gross private domestic investment, and limits to an expansionary fiscal posture will likely cap the rate at which the economy can grow. In turn, a slower growth trajectory could weaken revenue growth for the federal government, making it even more necessary for its developing and implementing a credible fiscal consolidation strategy. Given that challenge, it is quite likely that a combination of discretionary spending reductions and revenue increases will be deployed in any effort to cut the nation’s budget deficit. The extent of the tax hikes could have a material impact on economic growth.

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